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NOTES
BACK TO THE FUTURE:
PERMITTING HABEAS PETITIONS BASED
ON INTERVENING RETROACTIVE CASE LAW
TO ALTER CONVICTIONS AND SENTENCES
Lauren Casale*
In 1948, Congress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 2255, which authorizes a motion
for federal prisoners to “vacate, set aside or correct” their sentences, with
the goal of improving judicial efficiency in collateral review. Section
2255(e), known as the “savings clause,” allows federal inmates to challenge
the validity of their imprisonments with writs of habeas corpus if § 2255
motions are “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their]
detention[s].” Due to the U.S. Supreme Court’s and Congress’s silence
regarding what suffices as “inadequate or ineffective,” the circuit courts
have adopted varied standards.
The Sixth and Seventh Circuits hold that prisoners can use the savings
clause to challenge their convictions or sentences based on new retroactive
case law. On the other hand, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits prejudice
prisoners by prohibiting them from challenging their convictions or
sentences based on new case law. Recently, the Fourth Circuit expanded the
circuit split by agreeing with the Sixth and Seventh Circuits in United States
v. Wheeler. A petition for a writ of certiorari in Wheeler is currently pending
before the Supreme Court. This Note examines the circuits’ different
standards and contends that the circuits that foreclose savings clause
challenges impermissibly curtail prisoners’ rights. Further, this Note argues
that the Supreme Court must define the scope of the savings clause to permit
prisoners to challenge their convictions and sentences under the provision.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the last two decades, Charles “Gary” Bruce and Robert Bruce’s
interactions with the criminal justice system appeared virtually identical.1
The Bruce brothers have more in common than their genes; they also share
the same criminal convictions stemming from the crimes they jointly
committed.2 In the 1990s, the Western District of Tennessee imposed
indistinguishable sentences on Robert and Gary.3 Nevertheless, their
criminal fates finally diverged in 2016 and 2017 due to conflicting
interpretations of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).4
Overall, 28 U.S.C. § 2255 empowers federal prisoners to file motions “to
vacate, set aside, or correct” their sentences.5 Section 2255(e), known as the
“savings clause,” creates a pathway for prisoners to challenge their
incarcerations.6 If inmates show that a § 2255 motion is “inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention[s],” the savings clause
allows them to bring a § 2241 petition for a writ of habeas corpus.7 Congress
originally enacted this provision to promote judicial efficiency.8 However, a
clash among the circuits regarding what qualifies as “inadequate or
ineffective” has transformed this statute into a prisoners’ rights dilemma.9
This Note focuses on the circuit split’s ramifications for inmates, who may
be denied a chance to challenge their detentions solely because of the
inopportune location of their prisons.10 Comparing the Bruce brothers
highlights this conflict’s arbitrariness.
In January 1991, Gary and Robert Bruce, along with another brother and
a friend, killed two people and burned the victims’ bodies and home.11 A
1. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner at 3, McCarthan v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017)
(No. 17-85), 2017 WL 5508928, at *3.
2. Id.
3. Compare Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 176 (3d Cir. 2017) (noting that the Western
District of Tennessee sentenced Gary to life without parole plus ten years), with Bruce v.
Warden, 658 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam) (noting that the Western District
of Tennessee sentenced Robert to life in prison and ten years), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 683
(2017).
4. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180.
5. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012).
6. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 174.
7. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e); see Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774 (2008).
8. See infra notes 225–27 and accompanying text.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See infra note 77 and accompanying text.
11. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 175. Gary and Robert Bruce plotted to rob Danny Vine, the
operator of a nearby mussel shell camp, along with their brother, Jerry Bruce, and a friend,
David Riales. After restraining Vine and his fiancée, Della Thornton, Gary and Jerry Bruce
shot them. Once they completed the murders and arson, they fled the scene with stolen
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grand jury indicted each of the four men involved on eight counts,12 one of
which was witness-tampering murder.13 In 1995, Robert Bruce, his other
brother Jerry Bruce, and friend David Riales were tried in the Western
District of Tennessee.14 Gary Bruce, however, escaped from jail in July 1994
and remained on the run for fourteen months.15 Thus, Gary’s 1998 trial was
severed from that of his coconspirators.16 Nevertheless, Robert and Gary
Bruce were each convicted on all counts and each received a life sentence
with an additional ten-year term.17
After being convicted, Gary and Robert Bruce attempted to obtain
postconviction relief multiple times.18 Their efforts were unsuccessful until
they sought to invoke a 2011 U.S. Supreme Court decision,19 Fowler v.
United States.20 The Fowler decision clarified the government’s burden of
proof for federal witness-tampering murder,21 of which both Gary and Robert
had been convicted.22 Relying on the savings clause, the Bruce brothers filed
petitions for writs of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge their
detentions.23 They argued that their habeas petitions were appropriate
because the intervening Fowler decision rendered other forms of relief under
§ 2255 “inadequate or ineffective.”24 The Bruces claimed that they were

mussels. Days later, local police discovered the burned corpses of Vine, Thornton, and their
dog. Id.
12. Id. at 176. Ultimately, investigators connected them with the crime after learning that
Gary’s wife and brothers sold questionable mussel shells. Id. at 175.
13. A person has committed witness-tampering murder if he or she “kills or attempts to
kill another person, with intent to . . . prevent the communication by any person to a law
enforcement officer or judge of the United States of information relating to the commission or
possible commission of a Federal offense.” 18 U.S.C. § 1512(a)(1)(C) (2012); see also Bruce,
868 F.3d at 181.
14. United States v. Bruce, Nos. 95-6046 to 95-6049, 1996 WL 640468, at *1 (6th Cir.
Nov. 5, 1996). Robert and Jerry Bruce, as well as Riales, were convicted on all the charges.
Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176.
15. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 176; Bruce v. Warden, 658 F. App’x 935, 937 (11th Cir. 2016) (per curiam)
(noting that Robert’s sentence was life in prison and ten years), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 683
(2017). Despite Gary Bruce’s additional jailbreak offense, he received the same sentence. See
Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176.
18. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176 (noting that Gary Bruce previously filed a § 2255 motion
in 2011 and tried to obtain permission to file two additional § 2255 motions in 2012 and 2013,
which were denied); Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937 (stating that Robert Bruce previously filed a
§ 2255 motion, which a Tennessee district court denied in 1998, and attempted to file
additional § 2255 motions in 2003 and 2005, which were also denied).
19. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 183; Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937–38.
20. 563 U.S. 668 (2011).
21. Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937–38 (quoting Fowler, 563 U.S. at 677–78) (explaining that
Fowler requires the government to show that a person killed another with “intent to prevent
communications with federal law enforcement officers,” which is satisfied “only if it is
reasonably likely under the circumstances that (in the absence of the killing) at least one of
the relevant communications would have been made to a federal officer”).
22. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176.
23. Id. at 177; Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937.
24. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 176–77; Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937–38 (describing that the
crux of the Bruces’ petitions was the court’s jury instructions at trial, which did not include a
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innocent of witness-tampering murder because the conduct for which they
were convicted did not meet the requisite burden of proof under Fowler.25
Because Robert and Gary were imprisoned in different circuits, they were
forced to file their habeas petitions in different courts.26 This difference
subjected the petitions to markedly different judicial treatment, simply due
to the circuits’ contradictory readings of the savings clause.27
The Eleventh Circuit, where Robert Bruce was incarcerated, rejected his
claim.28 That court found that Robert was not foreclosed from raising a
Fowler-esque argument on direct appeal or in his first § 2255 motion.29
Accordingly, Robert Bruce did not satisfy the savings clause and lacked
jurisdiction to file his petition.30 Conversely, the Third Circuit reached the
opposite conclusion by relying on its prior holding that prisoners may use the
savings clause whenever a new, intervening, and substantive law may make
them innocent.31 Thus, the Third Circuit allowed Gary’s claim to proceed
and considered the merits of his actual-innocence argument.32
Juxtaposing the Bruce brothers’ disparate treatment highlights the inequity
that the savings clause circuit split poses for inmates based simply on a
prison’s location.33 Although Gary Bruce did not ultimately prevail on his
petition, the key difference is that he received an opportunity that his brother
was denied.34 If the Third Circuit had found that Gary demonstrated that he
was actually innocent of witness-tampering murder, he would have obtained
full habeas relief.35 In this scenario, Gary would have successfully shown
that he was unlawfully imprisoned for witness-tampering murder, and the
court would have thrown out his conviction on that charge.36 In contrast,
Robert Bruce’s conviction for witness-tampering murder would have

reasonable likeliness standard nor specify that federal law enforcement officers must be
implicated).
25. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 174; Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 937–38.
26. See infra notes 66, 215–18 and accompanying text for an explanation of the Bureau
of Prisons’s authority to determine where an inmate is incarcerated and the jurisdictional
requirement that prisoners file habeas petitions in the district where they are imprisoned.
27. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180.
28. Bruce, 658 F. App’x at 940.
29. Id. (determining that, earlier, Robert Bruce had a “genuine opportunity” to challenge
his conviction).
30. Id.
31. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180–81.
32. Id. at 181.
33. See id. at 181–82.
34. See id. at 183, 188–89 (finding that Gary Bruce’s habeas petition was unsuccessful
because he did not meet the standard of showing that “any reasonable juror faced with ‘all the
evidence,’ . . . would conclude that, had [the victims] survived, the likelihood that they would
have communicated with a federal officer was more than remote, outlandish, or simply
hypothetical,” and that “[i]t therefore follows that any reasonable juror would convict Bruce
of witness tampering murder”).
35. See id. at 184.
36. See id. at 182–84 (stating that courts have “no authority to leave in place a conviction
or sentence that violates a substantive rule”).
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remained, and he would still be incarcerated on all charges.37 Both Gary and
Robert Bruce acted in conjunction to commit the same crimes and received
equal punishments.38 Yet, only Gary, who arguably was even more culpable
because he escaped from prison, could challenge his incarceration.39
Critically, the circuit split on the savings clause’s scope is not limited to
the tests espoused by the Third and Eleventh Circuits.40 Besides disagreeing
over the availability of savings clause petitions to dispute an underlying
conviction, other circuits also allow savings clause relief for sentencing
defects.41 Though questions regarding the savings clause’s reach are not
new,42 this dilemma came to the forefront once again with a March 2018
decision that widened the circuit split, United States v. Wheeler.43 In
Wheeler, the Fourth Circuit expanded its interpretation of the savings clause
to allow prisoners to dispute their sentences, in addition to their
convictions.44 Characterized as an “entrenched conflict” in the government’s
October 2018 petition for a writ of certiorari,45 the savings clause controversy
highlights the particularly grave implications of this unsettled legal
question.46
Part I of this Note provides background information about the writ of
habeas corpus and the savings clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e). Next, Part II
describes the conflicting interpretations of the savings clause. Part III then
asserts that the Supreme Court must conclusively define the savings clause
to lessen arbitrariness, improve judicial and legal efficiency, and address this
recurring and fundamental prisoners’ rights issue. Finally, Part IV proposes
that the Supreme Court should permit savings clause relief for inmates
relying on intervening retroactive case law to challenge their convictions or
sentences.

37. See id. at 180 (observing that the Eleventh Circuit did not believe that Robert Bruce
was entitled to invoke the savings clause to challenge his witness-tampering murder
conviction under § 2241).
38. See supra notes 1–3, 17–19 and accompanying text.
39. See supra notes 28–32 and accompanying text.
40. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 23–24, United States v. Wheeler, No. 18-420
(U.S. Oct. 3, 2018) (stating that “[t]he courts of appeal are divided” and noting that even those
circuits permitting some savings clause relief “have offered varying rationales and have
adopted somewhat different formulations”).
41. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 429 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for
cert. filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2016);
Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013).
42. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 13, McCarthan v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017)
(No. 17-85), 2017 WL 3034223, at *13 (stating that this issue “cries out for the Court’s
intervention” and that “[t]he arguments on both sides of the conflict are well developed, with
the benefit of numerous opinions across nearly every regional circuit over the last two
decades”).
43. 886 F.3d 415 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018).
44. See id. at 428–29.
45. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 23.
46. See United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 893–94 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.)
(Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
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I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF HABEAS CORPUS AS
A FORM OF COLLATERAL REVIEW
This Part explores the development of the writ of habeas corpus, which
affords inmates an additional opportunity for judicial relief beyond the direct
appeals process. Part I.A briefly describes the origins of habeas corpus and
its early application in the American criminal justice system. Part I.B
provides an overview of current habeas law in the United States, including
the current statutory framework for this form of collateral review.
A. The Greatness of the “Great Writ”: A Brief History of Habeas Corpus
as a Crucial Safeguard for Prisoners
Collateral review is a way for courts to indirectly examine a decision apart
from a direct appeal.47 Examples of collateral proceedings include writs of
habeas corpus48 and motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence.49
Habeas corpus, which means “that you have the body” in Latin,50 is a
procedural tool that allows courts to evaluate whether a prisoner’s detention
is legally authorized.51 This legal recourse dates back to English common
law, where it was termed the “Great Writ.”52 Some have opined that the
availability of habeas corpus is the most fundamental human right.53
The American Founding Fathers similarly deemed habeas corpus to be the
“ultimate weapon” in the citizenry’s arsenal to guard their individual rights
against intrusion by the federal government.54 Consequently, the Suspension
Clause of the U.S. Constitution explicitly protects habeas corpus during times
of peace.55 When the states ratified the Constitution, the Suspension Clause
was understood to confer an affirmative right on all federal detainees to have

47. Wall v. Kholi, 562 U.S. 545, 551–53 (2011) (defining collateral review as “a judicial
reexamination of a judgment or claim in a proceeding outside of the direct review process”).
48. Id.
49. United States v. Robinson, 361 U.S. 220, 230 n.14 (1960) (remarking that “there are
a number of collateral remedies available to redress denial of basic rights”).
50. Habeas Corpus, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Jeffrey Toobin,
Killing Habeas Corpus, NEW YORKER (Dec. 4, 2006), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/
2006/12/04/killing-habeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/7XLY-HF8M].
51. See ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF LIBERTY
1 (2001); NANCY J. KING & JOSEPH L. HOFFMANN, HABEAS FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:
USES, ABUSES, AND THE FUTURE OF THE GREAT WRIT 4 (2011); LARRY W. YACKLE, FEDERAL
COURTS: HABEAS CORPUS 85 (2d ed. 2010).
52. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 51, at vii, 2–3.
53. DAVID CLARK & GERARD MCCOY, THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL RIGHT: HABEAS
CORPUS IN THE COMMONWEALTH 3–4 (2000) (observing that incarcerated individuals’ “ability
to exercise all other human rights is either severely restricted or virtually non-existent”).
54. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 432 (Alexander Hamilton) (Ian Shapiro ed., 2009)
(commenting that the writ of habeas corpus, along with the constitutional ban on ex post facto
laws and noble titles, may be the greatest constitutional “securities to liberty and
republicanism”); KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 51, at 3.
55. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2 (“The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be
suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”);
see also KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 51, at 3.
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a court scrutinize the legality of their confinements.56 Habeas relief is so
crucial that Congress cannot suspend it except when necessary to protect the
country’s safety.57 After the Civil War, Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus
Act of 1867, which allowed federal courts to also evaluate the validity of
state prisoners’ detentions.58
B. Modern Habeas Relief
Federal prisoners may seek habeas relief through two avenues59: a
traditional habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 224160 or a motion under
28 U.S.C. § 2255.61 This section discusses the modern statutory framework
for habeas corpus, analyzes more recent changes to habeas relief, and
considers the savings clause, which links § 2241 and § 2255.
1. Two Bodies of Review: § 2241 and § 2255 Frameworks
Prisoners challenging their sentences may seek collateral relief through
28 U.S.C. § 2241 or 28 U.S.C. § 2255.62 Congress initially enacted both
statutes in 194863 as responses to difficulties with the Habeas Corpus Act of
1867, which allowed more prisoners to file petitions.64
Federal detainees may file a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under
28 U.S.C. § 2241 to challenge their convictions or sentences.65 A prisoner
must bring a § 2241 petition in the district where he or she is imprisoned.66
56. See 1 DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE
FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 328 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 2d ed. 1881) (conveying the New York
ratifying convention’s belief that anyone who is “restrained of his liberty is entitled to an
inquiry into the lawfulness of such restraint, and to a removal thereof if unlawful”); see also
Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 744 (2008).
57. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
58. See KING & HOFFMANN, supra note 51, at 9.
59. Federal Habeas Corpus, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/usam/usam-9-37000federal-habeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/9DHW-3YDS] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
60. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(c) (2012).
61. Id. § 2255(a); see also YACKLE, supra note 51, at 86 (observing that “in 1948 Congress
largely eliminated the ability of federal convicts to attack their . . . sentences under § 2241 and
substituted a [§ 2255] motion procedure to perform the same function”).
62. Federal Habeas Corpus, supra note 59.
63. Lyn S. Entzeroth, Struggling for Federal Judicial Review of Successive Claims of
Innocence: A Study of How Federal Courts Wrestled with the AEDPA to Provide Individuals
Convicted of Non-Existent Crimes with Habeas Corpus Review, 60 U. MIAMI L. REV. 75, 81
(2005).
64. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 774–75 (2008); Nicholas Matteson, Note,
Feeling Inadequate?: The Struggle to Define the Savings Clause in 28 U.S.C. § 2255, 54 B.C.
L. REV. 353, 358–59 (2011) (observing that the 1867 act “resulted in habeas petitions
disproportionately clogging the dockets of those federal courts” because it required prisoners
to file habeas petitions in the district where they are confined and allowed state prisoners to
file habeas petitions); see also In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 608–09 (7th Cir. 1998).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2241.
66. Protocol for the Effective Handling of Collateral Attacks on Convictions Brought
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241, DEP’T JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resourcemanual-745-introduction-federal-habeas-corpus [https://perma.cc/7TRS-P629] (last visited
Feb. 12, 2019) (noting that this imposes a heavy burden on districts that house more prisoners
and causes judges “wholly unfamiliar with the prosecution” to consider the petition).
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Section 2241 petitions focus on the implementation of a prisoner’s
sentence.67 For example, an inmate may use a § 2241 habeas petition to
challenge “the administration of his parole, computation of his sentence by
parole officials, disciplinary actions taken against him, the type of detention,
and prison conditions in the facility where he is incarcerated.”68 As discussed
in Part I.B.3, the ability of federal prisoners to bring petitions under this
provision is very limited.
Federal prisoners may also file a motion to “vacate, set aside or correct [a]
sentence” under 28 U.S.C. § 2255.69 This provision does not apply to
inmates in state custody,70 who instead must avail themselves of traditional
§ 2241 habeas petitions.71 A federal inmate may use a § 2255 motion to
dispute the “imposition of his sentence.”72 In such a challenge, a petitioner
may argue that a sentence: (1) is unconstitutional or violates federal law;
(2) was imposed by a court that lacked jurisdiction; (3) exceeds the statutory
maximum; or (4) is otherwise subject to a collateral challenge.73 These
motions are federal inmates’ initial, and often sole, method of collateral
attack.74
Prisoners did not have access to these motions until Congress enacted
§ 2255 in 1948.75 Congress intended § 2255 to solve the issue of “habeas
petitions disproportionately clogging the dockets of those federal courts with
federal prisons within their territorial jurisdiction.”76 Consequently, the
statute departs from § 2241 in some respects. One significant distinction is
that federal inmates must bring § 2255 motions in the district court that
initially sentenced them rather than in the district where they are
imprisoned.77
Moreover, § 2255 largely prohibits federal prisoners from seeking relief
with § 2241 habeas petitions.78 Section 2255 declares that if prisoners
eligible to bring § 2255 motions fail to file them or if courts have already
rejected them, their writs of habeas corpus “shall not be entertained.”79
67. See Adams v. United States, 372 F.3d 132, 135 (2d Cir. 2004).
68. Id.
69. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
70. Matteson, supra note 64, at 359 (stating that § 2255 is a procedure created for federal
prisoners); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (entitled “Federal Custody”).
71. 28 U.S.C. § 2241(d) (referring to a habeas petition “made by a person in custody under
the judgment and sentence of a State court” (emphasis added)).
72. Adams, 372 F.3d at 135.
73. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(a).
74. See Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 178 (3d Cir. 2017).
75. See Brief for Amicus Curiae the Constitution Project in Support of the Petitioner at 3,
McCarthan v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017) (No. 17-85), 2017 WL 3531410, at *3
[hereinafter Constitution Project Brief].
76. Matteson, supra note 64, at 358 (emphasis added); see United States v. Hayman, 342
U.S. 205, 214 n.18 (1952) (observing that when § 2255 was passed over 60 percent of habeas
petitions were filed in just five courts); see also Constitution Project Brief, supra note 75, at
3.
77. Matteson, supra note 64, at 359.
78. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
79. Id.
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However, if federal inmates are able to satisfy an exception codified in
§ 2255(e), courts may consider their habeas petitions.80
2. Restrictive Amendments to Habeas Relief
Congress further restricted habeas petitions with the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA).81 In doing so, Congress
intended to “curb the abuse of the statutory writ of habeas corpus.”82 The
AEDPA added requirements for habeas relief to continue § 2255’s original
purpose of bolstering, not weakening, collateral relief.83 Nevertheless, courts
have grappled with the AEDPA’s revisions since its enactment.84 These
changes have elicited strong responses, such as that of Professor Anthony G.
Amsterdam of NYU School of Law, who called the AEDPA an “atomic
bomb . . . on the federal judiciary, [which] shatter[ed] the preexisting
structure of habeas corpus law.”85
Notable AEDPA amendments to § 2255 include a one-year statute of
limitations86 and a ban on successive motions unless a federal circuit court
approves them.87 The proscription on successive motions only permits a
prisoner to bring a second or consecutive § 2255 motion if a circuit court
certifies that it either: (1) includes newfound evidence demonstrating a
prisoner’s innocence, or (2) focuses on a new interpretation of constitutional
law that the Supreme Court deemed retroactive.88 These constraints on
motions to vacate, set aside, or correct a sentence are codified in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(h).89 Nevertheless, the limits on second or successive habeas

80. See id. This clause, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), is the primary focus of this paper. See infra
Part I.B.3 for further analysis.
81. YACKLE, supra note 51, at 110; Larry W. Yackle, A Primer on the New Habeas Corpus
Statute, 44 BUFF. L. REV. 381, 381 (1996).
82. H.R. REP. NO. 104-518, at 111 (1996) (Conf. Rep.). But see Stephen R. Reinhardt,
The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The Court’s Ever
Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of Constitutional Rights and
Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. REV. 1219, 1221 (2015)
(contending that the AEDPA was “misconceived at its inception and born of misguided
political ambition”).
83. See Boumediene v. Bush, 554 U.S. 723, 776 (2008).
84. See Lincoln Caplan, The Destruction of Defendants’ Rights, NEW YORKER (June 21,
2015),
https://www.newyorker.com/news/news-desk/the-destruction-of-defendants-rights
[https://perma.cc/JTM4-QA4D] (noting that the Supreme Court has interpreted the AEDPA
in approximately seventy cases).
85. Anthony G. Amsterdam, Foreword to 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL
HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, at v, v (7th ed. 2018); see also Caplan, supra note
84 (remarking that the AEDPA “gutted the federal writ of habeas corpus”).
86. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2012); see also Matteson, supra note 64, at 361; Note,
Suspended Justice: The Case Against 28 U.S.C. § 2255’s Statute of Limitations, 129 HARV.
L. REV. 1090, 1096–97 (2016).
87. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(B).
88. Matteson, supra note 64, at 361.
89. 28 U.S.C § 2255(h).

2019]

BACK TO THE FUTURE

1587

petitions are consistent with common-law principles.90 These modifications
are a modern codification of common-law limits to prevent “abuse of the
writ.”91
Furthermore, § 2255 recognizes a distinction between constitutional and
statutory decisions. To bring a § 2255 motion for a new constitutional
decision, “an inmate can only assert a claim anchored upon a new Supreme
Court ruling within one year of that ruling, so long as that ruling is
retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review.”92 In 2001, the
Supreme Court clarified the standard for retroactivity in Tyler v. Cain.93 The
Tyler decision explained that petitioners only satisfy the stringent
retroactivity standard if the Supreme Court applies a rule on collateral review
or issues further holdings making the rule retroactive.94 In practice, these
“austere retroactivity provisions”95 prevent lower courts from using a rule
that would render a prisoner’s conviction or sentence illegal solely because
the Supreme Court has not yet made it retroactive.96 This Note, however,
focuses on new statutory decisions, which petitioners can raise in savings
clause claims.
3. The Savings Clause
The restrictions on § 2255 motions discussed in Part I.B.2 do not apply to
§ 2241 petitions, which renders these petitions more appealing to inmates
trying to bring collateral challenges.97 Federal prisoners may file habeas
corpus petitions under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 if they: (1) are challenging the
execution of their sentences,98 or (2) satisfy the exception in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255(e), known as the savings clause.99 Otherwise, courts lack jurisdiction
90. See Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 664 (1996); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 553
U.S. 723, 774 (2008) (stating that these provisions “did not constitute a substantial departure
from common-law habeas procedures”).
91. Felker, 518 U.S. at 664 (considering the limits on second or successive petitions); see
also McCleskey v. Zant, 499 U.S. 467, 489 (1991) (defining “abuse” of the writ as “a complex
and evolving body of equitable principles informed and controlled by historical usage,
statutory developments, and judicial decisions”).
92. Thomas H. Gabay, Note, Using Johnson v. United States to Reframe Retroactivity for
Second or Successive Collateral Challenges, 84 FORDHAM L. REV. 1611, 1623 (2016) (quoting
28 U.S.C. § 2255(f)(3)).
93. 553 U.S. 656, 663–64, 666 (2001); Leah M. Litman, Judge Gorsuch and Johnson
Resentencing (This Is Not a Joke), 115 MICH. L. REV. ONLINE 67, 69 (2017).
94. Tyler, 553 U.S. at 663–64, 666; Litman, supra note 93, at 69.
95. Gabay, supra note 92, at 1624 (noting that this “significantly limit[s] the availability
of collateral relief even on a colorable claim of a new rule”).
96. See Litman, supra note 93, at 69.
97. See id. at 68 (explaining that federal inmates prefer § 2241 petitions because
“Congress imposed a litany of draconian conditions on prisoners’ ability to challenge their
convictions under section 2255”).
98. See supra notes 68–69 and accompanying text; see also Federal Habeas Corpus,
supra note 59 (providing an example of petitions alleging that the Bureau of Prisons
miscalculated a sentence or that prison conditions were inadequate).
99. United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 419 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed,
No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012); Federal Habeas Corpus,
supra note 59.
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to consider federal prisoners’ habeas petitions that challenge their
convictions or sentences.100 The savings clause states that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a prisoner who is
authorized to apply for relief by motion pursuant to [§ 2255], shall not be
entertained if it appears that the applicant has failed to apply for relief, by
motion, to the court which sentenced him, or that such court has denied him
relief, unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is inadequate or
ineffective to test the legality of his detention.101

Thus, § 2241 habeas petitions may only proceed under the savings clause
where a § 2255 motion is deemed “inadequate or ineffective.”102 This clause
provides a safety hatch that preserves habeas relief in limited circumstances
rather than barring writs of habeas corpus for federal prisoners in most
situations.103 By passing this provision, Congress preemptively avoided
claims that it unconstitutionally suspended habeas corpus.104
When Congress passed the savings clause, it rejected proposed language
that would have been more restrictive.105 Today, the savings clause
continues to present a challenge.106 Because the Supreme Court has not
circumscribed the provision’s reach, this inquiry has been left to the lower
courts, which are largely divided.107
II. A SPLIT IN THE SAVINGS CLAUSE: DIVERGENT INTERPRETATIONS
OF “INADEQUATE OR INEFFECTIVE”
This Part examines what Fourth Circuit Judge Steven G. Agee
characterized as the “deep and mature circuit split on the reach of the savings
clause.”108 Part II.A describes the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’ minority
approach, which prohibits habeas relief through the savings clause for
intervening retroactive changes in case law. Part II.B covers the varied
100. Protocol for the Effective Handling of Collateral Attacks on Convictions Brought
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2241, supra note 66 (observing that most § 2241 habeas petitions are
jurisdictionally defective because prisoners could bring § 2255 challenges for these claims).
101. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (emphasis added).
102. Id.; see also YACKLE, supra note 51, at 86–87.
103. See In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998).
104. Id.; see supra notes 54–57 (discussing the importance of the writ of habeas corpus to
the American constitutional order).
105. See Jennifer L. Case, Text Me: A Text-Based Interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e),
103 KY. L.J. 169, 178 (2014) (observing that the Judicial Conference Committee on Habeas
Corpus Procedure recommended another formulation of the savings clause, which
“prohibit[ed] a prisoner from filing a § 2241 habeas petition unless it was not ‘practicable to
determine his rights to discharge from custody on [a § 2255] motion because of his inability
to be present at the hearing on such motion, or for other reasons’” (second alteration in
original) (quoting United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 215 n.23 (1952))); see also infra
Part III.C.
106. See Matteson, supra note 64, at 363.
107. See id.; infra Part II.
108. United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 894 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (Agee, J.,
statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (quoting Bryant v. Warden, 738
F.3d 1253, 1279 (11th Cir. 2013), overruled by McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1084 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017)).
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approaches of the ten circuits that permit habeas petitions under the savings
clause for retroactive changes in law. This Part primarily focuses on the
Third and Fifth, Sixth and Seventh, and Fourth Circuits’ interpretations of
the savings clause.
A. The Minority Approach: Prisoners May Never Challenge Their
Convictions or Sentences Through the Savings Clause
The Tenth and Eleventh Circuits have the most restrictive view of the
savings clause and almost entirely foreclose this provision as a means of
relief.109 These circuits only allow savings clause habeas relief where
“something about the initial § 2255 procedure . . . itself is inadequate or
ineffective for testing a challenge to detention.”110 Under this standard, a
new legal rule alone is not sufficient to warrant relief in the form of a § 2241
petition.111 Instead, successful savings clause petitioners must demonstrate
a weakness in the actual § 2255 court proceedings.112 Examples of the
limited infirmities that are sufficient for savings clause relief include the
dissolution of the sentencing court,113 “practical considerations,”114 or a
challenge to the implementation of a sentence.115 The Tenth Circuit adopted
this test in a 2011 opinion written by then-Judge Neil Gorsuch, Prost v.
Anderson.116
The Prost court justified its test on several grounds.117 First, Judge
Gorsuch argued that the statute compels different meanings of the terms
“remedy” and “relief.”118 A court not granting relief to a prisoner is different
from the savings clause’s requirement that the “remedy by motion is
inadequate or ineffective.”119 From this distinction, Judge Gorsuch deduced
that so long as a prisoner had a chance to raise his or her claim, regardless of
his or her success on the merits, he or she cannot bring a subsequent habeas

109. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 16–17 (discussing the circuit split
and observing that “the Tenth Circuit, like the Eleventh Circuit . . . has categorically rejected
the proposition that an intervening and retroactively applicable statutory-interpretation
decision of this Court provides a basis for relief under Section 2255(e)” unlike the majority of
circuit courts).
110. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 589 (10th Cir. 2011); see also McCarthan, 851 F.3d
at 1080.
111. Prost, 636 F.3d at 589.
112. Id.
113. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1093 (explaining that for military prisoners, for example,
court martial proceedings cease to exist after sentencing).
114. Id. (observing that this may occur if there is more than one sentencing court).
115. Id. at 1092–93 (describing challenges to parole decisions).
116. 636 F.3d 578, 588 (10th Cir. 2011). Now a Supreme Court justice, Gorsuch could be
an instrumental figure should the Supreme Court take up the savings clause debate. See
Litman, supra note 93, at 67 (discussing Judge Gorsuch before President Trump appointed
him to the Supreme Court and stating that Prost “provides a nice glimpse into how Judge
Gorsuch might address matters that are reasonably susceptible to different resolution, as many
of the Supreme Court’s cases are”).
117. Prost, 636 F.3d at 584–88.
118. Id. at 584–85.
119. Id.
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petition under the savings clause.120 Second, the court determined that
Congress was aware that prisoners could raise challenges based on new
statutory interpretation rules.121 Congress’s ban on second or successive
petitions in § 2255(h), however, would be pointless if courts read the savings
clause expansively.122 Third, subsections (e), (f), and (h) of § 2255 focus on
“providing a single opportunity to test arguments” rather than the success of
such arguments.123 Consequently, § 2255(e) should be taken at face value
and courts should only allow § 2241 petitions if the prisoner had no chance
to raise his or her argument.124 Fourth, the savings clause was not intended
to give prisoners “multiple bites at the apple.”125 Instead, Congress passed
§ 2255 to address venue difficulties in habeas proceedings, not to change the
scope of prisoners’ rights in seeking collateral relief.126
The Eleventh Circuit followed in 2017 with McCarthan v. Director of
Goodwill Industries-Suncoast, Inc.127 In McCarthan, the Eleventh Circuit
eschewed its former rule128 and credited the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation as
the only one faithful to the statute.129 These circuits foreclose challenges
premised on unfavorable circuit precedent at the time of the initial § 2255
motion130—a common basis for savings clause relief in other circuits.131 The
justification provided by these circuits is that petitioners may always contest
adverse circuit case law in their initial § 2255 motions, which are “fully
available and amply sufficient.”132 Drawing a comparison, Prost rationalizes
that “a student’s failure to imagine a novel or creative answer to an exam
120. Id. at 585 (stating that the savings clause “emphasizes its concern with ensuring the
prisoner an opportunity or chance to test his argument” and that “with this opportunity comes
no guarantee about outcome or relief”).
121. Id. at 585–86.
122. See id. at 586.
123. Id. at 587.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 588.
126. Id. at 587–88.
127. 851 F.3d 1076 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017). In this case, petitioner
Daniel McCarthan sought to dispute his prison sentence stemming from a felon-in-possession
charge. McCarthan was originally sentenced as a “career offender” because of three earlier
convictions. However, an intervening retroactive decision held that one of McCarthan’s prior
convictions did not count toward the career offender designation. Accordingly, McCarthan
argued that his sentence should be reviewed because the sentencing court relied on incorrect
benchmarks. See id. at 1079–81; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 5–6; see
also infra Part IV.D.
128. The Eleventh Circuit previously employed a five-prong test, which allowed for
savings clause relief based on new precedent. However, it only permitted relief in two cases
using that former test. See McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1080, 1096–99 (explaining that prior
“precedents have failed to adhere to the text of section 2255(e), have not incurred significant
reliance interests, and have proved unworkable, [thus] today we overrule them”).
129. See id. at 1080, 1085 (noting that “[w]e join the Tenth Circuit in applying the law as
Congress wrote it” and avowing that “[o]nly the Tenth Circuit has adhered to—or even
seriously considered—the text of the saving clause”).
130. See id. at 1086–87; Prost, 636 F.3d at 590.
131. See infra Part II.B for further discussion of the different majority interpretations.
132. Prost, 636 F.3d at 589–90 (observing that the petitioner’s entire argument was based
on the improbability of success if he challenged circuit precedent because “he was entirely
free to raise and test” the law); McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1086.
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question doesn’t make the exam an inadequate or ineffective procedure for
testing his knowledge.”133 Accordingly, even if settled law squarely
contradicts their position, petitioners and their lawyers are expected to
brainstorm compelling challenges to precedent.134
B. The Majority Approach
Ten circuits allow prisoners to bring § 2241 challenges through the savings
clause under certain circumstances.135 On the whole, these circuits find that
an intervening change in legal precedent makes other relief inadequate or
ineffective under § 2255(e), albeit under different circumstances in different
circuits.136 The circuits that follow the majority view have diverse rules for
§ 2255(e) relief with significant implications for petitioners.137 A critical
point of departure is that some circuits only permit savings clause relief to
challenge the legitimacy of an underlying conviction, whereas others also
permit relief to dispute the validity of a sentence.138
As a threshold matter, in conviction or sentence disputes, petitioners
seeking to use the savings clause must first demonstrate that they have
exhausted all other opportunities for relief under § 2255.139 A petitioner
could be successful, for example, by showing that he or she previously filed
133. Prost, 636 F.3d at 589.
134. See id.; see also Adam Liptak, Serving Extra Years in Prison, and the Courthouse
Doors Are Closed, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/20/us/
politics/trump-justice-department-prison-sentences.html [https://perma.cc/3K4P-VR3E].
135. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert.
filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017); Hill
v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 594–95 (6th Cir. 2016); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 586 (7th
Cir. 2013); Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 898 (9th Cir. 2006) (requiring savings clause
petitioners to (1) claim they are actually innocent, and (2) show that they have not had an
unobstructed procedural opportunity to bring their challenge); Abdullah v. Hedrick, 392 F.3d
957, 960 (8th Cir. 2004) (using the same test as the Ninth Circuit); In re Smith, 285 F.3d 6, 8
(D.C. Cir. 2002) (failing to adopt the Seventh Circuit’s test or create its own test but relying
on Seventh Circuit precedent for the idea that “§ 2255 ‘can fairly be termed inadequate when
it is so configured as to deny a convicted defendant any opportunity for judicial rectification
of so fundamental a defect in his conviction as having been imprisoned for a nonexistent
offense’” (quoting In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 611 (7th Cir. 1998))); Reyes-Requena v.
United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001) (requiring petitioners to allege they: (1) are
imprisoned for actions that are no longer criminal due to an intervening retroactive Supreme
Court decision, and (2) have had no prior opportunity to dispute this conviction based on the
intervening change); United States v. Barrett, 178 F.3d 34, 52 (1st Cir. 1999) (observing that
savings clause relief is allowed in some instances but deciding that “it is not necessary in this
case to articulate those circumstances precisely—we leave that task for another day”);
Triestman v. United States, 124 F.3d 361, 377 (2d Cir. 1997) (stating that savings clause
claims are viable in “at the least, the set of cases in which the petitioner cannot, for whatever
reason, utilize § 2255, and in which the failure to allow for collateral review would raise
serious constitutional questions”).
136. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 23–24.
137. See infra Part III.A.
138. See infra Part II.B.
139. See United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 894–96 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.)
(Thacker, J., statement on petition for rehearing en banc) (noting that Wheeler lacked another
way to bring a challenge because he previously filed a direct appeal and § 2255 motion); supra
notes 87, 88–90 and accompanying text (discussing § 2255(h)’s ban on multiple motions).
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a § 2255 motion on other grounds.140 Since § 2255(h) largely limits second
or successive motions under that statute, the petitioner must show that he or
she has no other vehicle for invoking new retroactive case law.141
Significantly, since petitioners could already bring second or successive
§ 2255 motions if the case law announces a new constitutional rule, they must
also assert that the new precedent they are invoking is a statutory
interpretation decision.142 These considerations apply in every circuit that
allows some degree of savings clause relief.143
Beyond these initial considerations, the circuits have set different limits on
the reach of § 2255(e) relief. First, Part II.B.1 examines the Third and Fifth
Circuits’ standard, which permits prisoners to use intervening retroactive
case law to challenge the validity of their underlying convictions but not the
implementation of their sentences.144 Part II.B.2 next looks at the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits’ standard, which is distinct in permitting prisoners to rely
on intervening retroactive case law to challenge the validity of their sentences
in addition to their convictions.145 Finally, Part II.B.3 analyzes the recently
extended Fourth Circuit rule, which also permits challenges to sentences
through the savings clause. The Fourth Circuit broadened its interpretation
of the savings clause in March 2018, which is the basis of a petition for a writ
of certiorari pending before the Supreme Court. This section also discusses
the intracircuit disagreement over the reach of the Fourth Circuit’s test.
1. Many Circuits Allow Prisoners to Challenge Their Underlying
Convictions Through the Savings Clause
Most circuits allow prisoners to use the savings clause to challenge their
convictions.146 Of these majority approaches, the Third and Fifth Circuits
rely on a stricter construction of the savings clause which requires that
prisoners demonstrates their “actual innocence.”147 Under this theory,
prisoners must (1) allege that they are imprisoned for actions that are no
longer deemed criminal due to an intervening Supreme Court decision that

140. See Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 895 (Thacker, J., statement on petition for rehearing en
banc); supra notes 87, 88–90 and accompanying text (discussing § 2255(h)’s ban on multiple
motions).
141. See Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 894–95 (Thacker, J., statement on petition for rehearing
en banc) (noting that Wheeler was left with a “conundrum”).
142. See id. (noting that Wheeler’s challenge did not involve a constitutional rule); supra
notes 87, 88–90 and accompanying text.
143. These factors are part of § 2255 and bear on the meaning of “inadequate or
ineffective” under the savings clause. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text.
144. In such challenges, an inmate argues that, based on an intervening decision, his or her
conduct does not fulfill the requirements of the crime for which he or she was convicted. Thus,
the inmate contests his or her conviction and argues that he or she is not guilty under the law.
See infra Part II.B.1.
145. An inmate bringing this type of challenge contends that due to an intervening decision,
the original court incorrectly sentenced him. See infra Parts II.B.2–3.
146. See supra note 135 and accompanying text.
147. See, e.g., Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 180 (3d Cir. 2017); Reyes-Requena v.
United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904 (5th Cir. 2001).
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applies retroactively, and (2) have had no prior opportunity to dispute these
convictions based on the intervening change in precedent.148
The first prong of this test follows the Supreme Court’s standard for actual
innocence. This requires petitioners to show that, based on all evidence
presented, “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have
convicted” them.149 Retroactivity is determined in accordance with the
plurality opinion in Teague v. Lane.150 Under Teague, new cases interpreting
constitutional issues of criminal procedure do not apply retroactively.151 A
new rule may only be retroactive if it is substantive152 or a “watershed rule[]
of criminal procedure.”153 This test’s second prong distinguishes between
Supreme Court constitutional decisions and statutory interpretation
decisions.154 Because § 2255 already permits additional motions based on
new Supreme Court rules of constitutional law, such decisions are not
sufficient for savings clause relief.155 Therefore, only claims based on
statutory interpretation decisions may proceed through the savings clause.156
The Third and Fifth Circuits are unique in that they only permit savings
clause claims to proceed on a theory of actual innocence.157 However, the
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits, which this Note discusses in the
following two sections, also allow savings clause challenges to
convictions.158 As the Third Circuit observed, permitting challenges to
underlying convictions avoids the “thorny constitutional issue” that would
arise if an inmate continued to be incarcerated despite statutory case law
148. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 180 (quoting United States v. Tyler, 732 F.3d 241, 246 (3d Cir.
2013)); Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904 (explaining that the second prong is met where the
petitioner’s claim was foreclosed by circuit precedent at earlier times when it could have been
raised). Gary Bruce’s argument based on Fowler is an example. See supra notes 20–24, 31–
36 and accompanying text. If Gary had been able to show that, based on all the evidence, it
was more likely than not that the victims would not have communicated with federal officials
as required for witness-tampering murder, he may have prevailed. See supra note 34.
149. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 184 (quoting Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998)).
150. 489 U.S. 288 (1989).
151. Id. at 310.
152. Id. at 307 (describing a substantive rule as one that makes “certain kinds of primary,
private individual conduct beyond the power of the criminal law-making authority to
proscribe” (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 692 (1971) (Harlan, J.,
concurring))).
153. Id. at 311 (stating that a new rule of criminal procedure is one that “requires the
observance of ‘those procedures that . . . are “implicit in the concept of ordered liberty”’”
(quoting Mackey, 401 U.S. at 693–94 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
154. See Reyes-Requena v. United States, 243 F.3d 893, 904–05 (5th Cir. 2001).
155. See id.
156. Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 179–80 (3d Cir. 2017); Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at
904–05.
157. See, e.g., Bruce, 868 F.3d at 177; Reyes-Requena, 243 F.3d at 904.
158. See, e.g., Webster v. Daniels, 784 F.3d 1123, 1136 (7th Cir. 2015) (observing that the
Seventh Circuit has gone further than its prior holdings, which were limited to actual
innocence); Wooten v. Cauley, 677 F.3d 303, 307 (6th Cir. 2012) (stating that the Sixth
Circuit’s actual innocence standard stems from Bousley and, before the Sixth Circuit allowed
challenges to convictions, this was the only way to obtain savings clause relief in the circuit);
In re Jones, 226 F.3d 328, 333–34 (4th Cir. 2000) (establishing the Fourth Circuit’s test for
actual innocence savings clause claims).
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establishing his or her innocence.159 Importantly, though, the Fourth, Sixth,
and Seventh Circuits take a broader view and also entertain challenges to
sentences.
2. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits Also Permit Petitioners to Dispute
Their Sentences Through the Savings Clause
Besides viewing the savings clause as permitting relief for challenges to
convictions, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits espouse the same test for inmates
who seek to use the savings clause to challenge their sentences.160 On such
claims, petitioners must demonstrate that they are relying on: (1) a case
involving a statutory interpretation dispute (2) that is retroactive and could
not have been raised in their first § 2255 motions and (3) that “the misapplied
sentence presents an error sufficiently grave to be deemed a miscarriage of
justice or a fundamental defect.”161 The Seventh Circuit first drew this
conclusion from a textualist approach in Brown v. Caraway162 and the Sixth
Circuit later followed in Hill v. Masters.163 Both averred that savings clause
petitioners can have a plausible claim for collateral relief by disputing the
validity of their detentions without showing that they are innocent of their
underlying convictions.164 Thus, in the Sixth and Seventh Circuits, the
savings clause can be invoked without proving actual innocence.165
Notably, the Sixth and Seventh Circuits did not seem to foresee this
interpretation applying broadly. The Sixth Circuit believed that its test would
be limited to a small portion of petitioners.166 While both circuits adopted
the test as described above, they also referred to another consideration—the
U.S. Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines”).167 The Sixth Circuit stated that
only prisoners who were sentenced under the Guidelines before United States
v. Booker,168 which rendered them advisory as opposed to mandatory, could
159. Bruce, 868 F.3d at 179.
160. Hill v. Masters, 836 F.3d 591, 595 (6th Cir. 2016); accord Brown v. Caraway, 719
F.3d 583, 586 (7th Cir. 2013).
161. Hill, 836 F.3d at 595; accord Brown, 719 F.3d at 586. For example, Hill claimed the
following: First, in Descamps v. United States, 576 U.S. 254 (2013), the Supreme Court
arguably restricted how courts determine if a state crime is a “violent felon[y]” that enhances
a sentence under the Armed Career Criminal Act. Hill, 836 F.3d at 595. Based on Descamps,
the Fourth Circuit later determined that one of Hill’s predicate offenses, which enhanced his
sentence, was not a violent felony. Id. at 595–96. Second, the government conceded that the
statutory interpretation decision in Descamps and the subsequent Fourth Circuit case applied
retroactively. Id. at 595–96. Since they were not constitutional decisions, prisoners could not
raise these cases in second or successive motions under § 2255(h). Id. Third, the court
erroneously subjected Hill to a sentencing enhancement, and so he argued that his misapplied
sentence under the Guidelines was a “fundamental error.” Id.
162. 719 F.3d 583 (7th Cir. 2013).
163. Hill, 836 F.3d at 599; Brown, 719 F.3d at 588.
164. See Hill, 836 F.3d at 598; Brown, 719 F.3d at 588.
165. Hill, 836 F.3d at 595; Brown, 719 F.3d at 586 (departing from other circuits’
interpretations, including that of the Fifth Circuit, which requires actual innocence).
166. See Hill, 836 F.3d at 599–600.
167. Id.; Brown, 719 F.3d at 588.
168. 543 U.S. 220 (2005).
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challenge their sentences through the savings clause.169 The Seventh Circuit
similarly said that “a petitioner may utilize the savings clause to challenge
the misapplication of the career offender Guideline, at least where, as here,
the defendant was sentenced in the pre-Booker era.”170
In Hill, the Sixth Circuit also supported its holding with Judge Robert
Gregory’s dissenting opinion in the since-vacated Fourth Circuit case written
by Judge Agee, United States v. Surratt.171 The court compared Hill and
Brown to Surratt, noting, “Serving a sentence imposed under mandatory
guidelines (subsequently lowered by retroactive Supreme Court precedent)
shares similarities with serving a sentence imposed above the statutory
maximum. Both sentences are beyond what is called for by law . . . and both
raise a fundamental fairness issue.”172 Therefore, these circuits seem to
permit a prisoner to challenge his or her sentence under the savings clause
based on retroactively applicable statutory precedent if the sentence:
(1) exceeds the statutory maximum; or (2) was imposed under mandatory
Guidelines subsequently made noncompulsory, regardless of whether the
sentence was above or below the statutory maximum.173
3. The Fourth Circuit’s Recent Expansion of the Savings Clause
Also Encompasses Sentence-Based Challenges
In March 2018, the Fourth Circuit reconsidered and revised its
interpretation of § 2255(e) in United States v. Wheeler.174 Despite previously
limiting savings clause petitions to actual innocence claims, the Fourth
Circuit adopted a more expansive savings clause test in Wheeler.175 In
October 2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari.176
In 2008, the Western District of North Carolina sentenced Gerald Wheeler
to ten years’ imprisonment.177 Due to Wheeler’s 1996 felony conviction, the
Guidelines mandated an enhanced sentence of ten years to life.178 At
sentencing, the court expressed its dissatisfaction with the mandatory
sentencing restrictions, remarking, “[T]he sentence that is required to be
imposed upon you is a harsh sentence. It’s a mandatory minimum sentence.
I don’t have any discretion in that area.”179

169. See Hill, 836 F.3d at 599–600.
170. Brown, 719 F.3d at 588.
171. 797 F.3d 240 (4th Cir. 2015), vacated as moot, 855 F.3d 218 (4th Cir. 2017).
172. Hill, 836 F.3d at 599.
173. See id. at 599–600; accord Brown, 719 F.3d at 587.
174. United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert. filed,
No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018).
175. See United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 893 n.1 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.)
(Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (noting that the Third
and Fifth Circuits’ actual-innocence standard is consistent with the Fourth Circuit’s prior case
law, which only permitted savings clause challenges to convictions).
176. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40.
177. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 419.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 420.
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Wheeler’s subsequent savings clause petition relied on United States v.
Simmons,180 which was decided in 2011.181 Under Simmons, which the
Fourth Circuit determined applied retroactively, Wheeler’s 1996 conviction
was not a felony drug offense.182 Consequently, Wheeler did not qualify for
Absent this
a sentencing enhancement under the Guidelines.183
enhancement, Wheeler would have faced a Guidelines range of seventy to
eighty-seven months and a statutory range of five to forty years in prison,
which is a significant difference from the range under which he was
sentenced in 2008.184 In permitting Wheeler to dispute his sentence, the
Fourth Circuit set the following parameters: (1) “at the time of sentencing,
settled law of this circuit or the Supreme Court established the legality of the
sentence;” (2) the law changed after the prisoner appealed and filed an initial
§ 2255 motion and this change applies retroactively; (3) the prisoner cannot
fulfill § 2255(h)(2)’s requirements for second or successive motions; and
(4) the retroactive change caused a mistake in sentencing that is “sufficiently
grave to be deemed a fundamental defect.”185
The Fourth Circuit justified extending the savings clause to sentence
challenges by reasoning that prisoners would otherwise have no way to
rectify “a fundamental defect which inherently results in a complete
miscarriage of justice.”186 The Wheeler majority also cited Sixth and
Seventh Circuit precedent to support its test,187 though this later generated
pushback.188 The court specifically relied on Hill and Brown for the premise
that a mistake in sentencing could qualify as a fundamental defect even if the
sentence imposed did not surpass the legal maximum.189 This rule was
instrumental in Wheeler’s case because, even applying Simmons,190 he could
be resentenced to the same ten-year term under the statutory range.191
However, after Wheeler, Judge Agee cast doubt on this interpretation.192
Judge Agee disputed the Wheeler majority’s characterization of Hill and
180. 635 F.3d 140 (4th Cir.), vacated and remanded, 649 F.3d 237 (4th Cir. 2011).
181. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 421 (citing Simmons, 635 F.3d 140).
182. Id. (explaining that Simmons was made retroactive in Miller v. United States, 735 F.3d
141 (4th Cir. 2013)).
183. Id.
184. Id. at 420; see supra notes 177–79 and accompanying text.
185. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 429.
186. Id. at 428 (quoting Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974)).
187. Id. at 429, 432.
188. See United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 893 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (Agee,
J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc).
189. See Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 433 (“Thus, like the Seventh Circuit, the Sixth Circuit also
recognizes the fundamental significance of a proper sentencing range. We agree with our
sister circuits’ view . . . .”).
190. Under Simmons, Wheeler’s 1996 conviction was not a predicate offense warranting a
sentencing enhancement. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying text.
191. While the district court’s stated dissatisfaction with the Guidelines makes the ten-year
sentence unlikely, Wheeler could have received up to forty years regardless. See Wheeler, 886
F.3d at 420.
192. See Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for
rehearing en banc) (questioning the majority’s approach and calling on the Supreme Court to
review this issue).
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Brown and claimed that the Fourth Circuit adopted the broadest interpretation
of the savings clause and “fundamental defect.”193 He argued that, contrary
to the majority opinion, savings clause sentence challenges are only viable in
the Sixth and Seventh Circuits if prisoners will be imprisoned for a period
longer than Congress has authorized.194
Judge Agee’s argument highlights what Fourth Circuit Judge Stephanie
Thacker characterized as a legal “conundrum.”195 Though Wheeler could
receive the exact same punishment on remand, the intervening change in law
is significant because his sentence no longer reflects a statutorily mandated
minimum.196 Judges Agee and Thacker disagree over the proper reading of
Brown and Hill and whether the petitioners in those cases were originally
sentenced below or above the statutory maximum.197 Accordingly, there is
a dilemma regarding whether claims like Wheeler’s would indeed be
foreclosed under the Sixth and Seventh Circuits’ test.198
III. AN IMPERATIVE INTERPRETATION: THE IMPORTANCE OF THE
SUPREME COURT CONSTRUING THE SAVINGS CLAUSE EXPANSIVELY
The courts of appeals’ distinct interpretations of the savings clause present
a puzzling circuit split that prejudices inmates detained in certain locations.
As Third Circuit Judge D. Michael Fisher noted, “[B]y enacting § 2255[,]
Congress sought to alleviate the inefficiencies [of § 2241] . . . . Now those
difficulties have returned, though in a new form. And so they will remain, at
least until Congress or the Supreme Court speaks on the matter.”199 The
circuits’ conflicting interpretations have transformed the savings clause into
an inefficient provision due to the disparate and unpredictable results it
creates for inmates.200 Currently, some prisoners may invoke new case law
for potential release, while others imprisoned in different circuits will remain
incarcerated without review.201
Furthermore, prisoners have no “constitutional right to counsel when
mounting collateral attacks.”202 Thus, most habeas petitions are filed by pro

193. Id. (observing that the majority “relies on these cases in error”). But see Wheeler, 886
F.3d at 433 (stating that it agrees with the Sixth and the Seventh Circuits, which hold that “a
sentencing error need not result in a sentence that exceeds statutory limits in order to be a
fundamental defect”).
194. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for
rehearing en banc).
195. Id. at 894 (Thacker, J., statement on petition for rehearing en banc).
196. See id. at 894–95 (observing the difficulties Wheeler faced to challenge the legality of
his detention where a court sentenced him under an erroneous mandatory minimum).
197. Compare id. at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en
banc), with Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 432. For further discussion see infra Part IV.B.
198. Compare Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of
petition for rehearing en banc), with Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 433.
199. See Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 181 (3d Cir. 2017).
200. See infra Part III.B.
201. See supra Part II.
202. See Pennsylvania v. Finley, 481 U.S. 551, 555 (1987) (“Our cases establish that the
right to appointed counsel extends to the first appeal of right, and no further.”).
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se litigants.203 The uncertainty surrounding the savings clause’s scope makes
collateral review even more challenging for prisoners to navigate. For this
reason, Judge Agee also implored the Supreme Court to consider this issue
as soon as possible.204 Agee observed that a prompt Supreme Court decision
would ensure “that the federal courts, Congress, the Bar, and the public will
have the benefit of clear guidance and consistent results in this important area
of law.”205
Agreeing with the government, which filed a petition for a writ of certiorari
in Wheeler, and Judges Agee and Fisher, this Part argues that the Supreme
Court must decisively interpret the savings clause. Though Judge Fisher is
correct that Congress could remedy the savings clause dispute, parties on
both sides concur that a legislative solution is unlikely.206 Accordingly, the
Court should grant certiorari in a case that presents this issue. Importantly,
the most likely candidate for Supreme Court review at the moment, Wheeler,
does not squarely present the issue.207 Wheeler focuses on savings clause
challenges to sentences rather than convictions.208 In 2017, the Court denied
certiorari in McCarthan and declined to review the Eleventh Circuit’s refusal
to extend savings clause relief under either theory.209 Given the circuit split’s
recent expansion,210 the Court should grant certiorari in Wheeler. However,
if the Supreme Court finds that Wheeler is not a suitable vehicle for review
or if the case becomes moot,211 the Court should grant certiorari upon
receiving a viable petition addressing this issue.
203. Jude Obasi Nkama, Note, The Great Writ Encumbered by Great Limitations: Is the
Third Circuit’s Notice Requirement for Habeas Relief a Structural Bias Against “Persons in
Custody?,” 26 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 181, 184 (2001).
204. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 894 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for
rehearing en banc). In October 2018, the government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in
Wheeler. See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40. In this petition, the
Solicitor General urges the Supreme Court to adopt the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits’
interpretation—a position that the government had only recently embraced. The government
argues that the Supreme Court should prohibit savings clause challenges for intervening
retroactive changes in case law. See id. at 13. In November, Wheeler’s counsel waived his
right to reply to the petition. Waiver of Right to Respond for Respondent, United States v.
Wheeler, No. 18-420 (U.S. Nov. 5, 2018). Nevertheless, the Supreme Court requested a reply
brief from Wheeler. Response Requested, United States v. Wheeler, No. 18-420 (U.S. Nov.
13, 2018). On January 14, 2019, Wheeler’s counsel filed a reply brief opposing the petition.
Brief in Opposition, United States v. Wheeler, No. 18-420 (U.S. Jan. 14, 2019).
205. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 894 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for
rehearing en banc).
206. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 13 (arguing that “[o]nly [the
Supreme] Court’s intervention can provide the necessary clarity” in the government’s petition
for certiorari); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 26 (observing the
“unlikelihood of congressional intervention” in a prisoner’s petition for certiorari).
207. See supra Part II.B.3.
208. See supra Part II.B.3.
209. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at I (stating that the question
presented involves whether a petitioner can use the savings clause to bring a habeas petition
“to raise a claim that his conviction or sentence is invalid under an intervening and
retroactively applicable statutory-interpretation decision of this Court” (emphasis added)).
210. See supra Part II.B.3.
211. See United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 893 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (Agee,
J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc) (recognizing “the potential
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This Note posits that the Court must preserve both avenues of savings
clause relief—sentences and convictions. While Congress has not directly
addressed the circuits’ divergent interpretations of the savings clause, broad
savings clause relief aligns with its recent interest in criminal justice
initiatives.212 The Supreme Court’s final interpretation of § 2255(e)’s scope
is necessary to reduce arbitrariness and legal and judicial inefficiencies.
Moreover, the savings clause presents a recurring and fundamental issue that
mandates the Court’s intervention.
A. The Circuit Split Fosters Arbitrariness for Prisoners
Together, venue requirements and contradictory interpretations of the
savings clause create a predicament for habeas petitioners.213 As discussed
above, parties must file § 2241 habeas petitions in the district where they are
imprisoned, not the district that convicted and sentenced them.214 Inmates
are assigned to prisons based on various factors.215 Once a federal court
sentences a defendant, it delegates exclusive authority to the Bureau of
Prisons to determine where the defendant will be imprisoned.216 Generally,
the Bureau endeavors to incarcerate defendants in a prison located within a
500-mile radius of their homes, but such placements are not guaranteed.217
Furthermore, even when defendants are imprisoned within this radius, there
is no assurance that the prison is necessarily located within the circuit of their
initial convictions.218
Since neither prisoners nor courts control where inmates are sent, inmates
face the possibility of being denied an opportunity that is given to otherwise
similarly situated prisoners.219 The Bruce cases underscore the potentially
grave consequences of disjointed interpretations of § 2255(e).220 The Bruces
committed the same underlying offenses together, were charged with and
convicted of identical crimes, and sentenced to the same prison terms.221 The
only fork in the Bruces’ road through the criminal justice system stemmed
from disparate approaches to the savings clause.222 Though the circuit
permitting relief ultimately did not rule in Gary Bruce’s favor, offering only
one brother the opportunity to challenge his detention is problematic in
that the case may become moot if Wheeler is released from incarceration in October 2019, as
projected,” which caused Judge Agee to decline to poll the Fourth Circuit for rehearing en
banc to “expedite the path for the Government to petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court”).
212. See infra notes 255–61 and accompanying text.
213. See supra text accompanying note 77.
214. See supra notes 66, 77 and accompanying text.
215. See Designations, FED. BUREAU PRISONS, https://www.bop.gov/inmates/custody_
and_care/designations.jsp [https://perma.cc/QP8G-CB93] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019).
216. See id.
217. Id. (stating that if inmates are placed outside this radius, “generally, it is due to specific
security, programming, or population concerns”).
218. See id. (failing to mention a judicial circuit as a consideration in placing inmates).
219. See supra notes 1–4, 11–37 and accompanying text.
220. See supra notes 1–4, 11–37 and accompanying text.
221. See supra notes 4, 27–37 and accompanying text.
222. See supra notes 26–34 and accompanying text.
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itself.223 This disparate treatment highlights why “nationwide uniformity as
to the savings clause’s scope” is desirable and “only [the Supreme] Court’s
intervention can ensure” it.224
B. The Circuit Split Promotes Legal and Judicial Inefficiency
Parties on both sides of this debate agree that differing interpretations of
§ 2255(e) contradict, rather than advance, Congress’s purpose in enacting
this statute.225 After examining the legislative history of § 2255, the
Supreme Court found no indication of legislative intent to curtail collateral
remedies.226 Rather, its “sole purpose was to minimize the difficulties
encountered in habeas corpus hearings by affording the same rights in
another and more convenient forum.”227 This solution, however, is now the
source of other obstacles for prisoners attempting to rely on the savings
clause. Without binding Supreme Court precedent, the government and
individual circuits may revisit and change their constructions of the savings
clause whenever they see fit.228 This presents confusion and uncertainty for
petitioners, judges, and lawyers alike.229
Over the last twenty years, the Department of Justice (DOJ) has changed
its official construction of the savings clause three times.230 Soon after
Congress passed the AEDPA in 1996, the DOJ interpreted the clause as
foreclosing § 2241 habeas petitions even for inmates arguing that new case
law makes them innocent.231 In 1998, the DOJ shifted its position and
maintained that prisoners could bring § 2241 petitions under the savings
clause if, based on a new rule, their sentences either exceeded the statutory
maximum or were incorrectly calculated from the Guidelines.232 Yet, in the
DOJ’s McCarthan brief in October 2017, it returned to its initial stance.233
Later, in its petition for a writ of certiorari in Wheeler, the DOJ justified this
shift.234 In this petition, the DOJ noted that “its original interpretation of
Section 2255(e) was correct, and . . . a contrary reading would be
insufficiently faithful to the statute’s text and to Congress’s evident purpose
in limiting the circumstances in which a criminal defendant may file a second
or successive petition for collateral review.”235

223. See supra notes 26–36 and accompanying text.
224. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 25–26.
225. Id. at 13; Constitution Project Brief, supra note 75, at 13.
226. See United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205, 219 (1952).
227. Id. at 219 (emphasis added).
228. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
229. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
230. Brief for Respondent in Opposition at 12, McCarthan v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017)
(No. 17-85).
231. See id.; Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 24–25.
232. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 230, at 12; Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 40, at 13.
233. See Brief for Respondent in Opposition, supra note 230, at 11–13.
234. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 13.
235. Id.
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While the government is certainly entitled to revise its understanding of
statutes, the latest modification was characterized as uncommon236 and
“opportunistic.”237 Further, the Fourth Circuit expressed skepticism of the
government’s reasons for backtracking.238 The court criticized the
government, stating that its “about-face is particularly distasteful in this case
wherein [it] cannot identify any principled reason for its turnabout” and
noting that “[i]t was not until oral argument that the [government] attributed
this change of position to ‘new leadership in the [DOJ].’”239
Moreover, the DOJ also reversed course regarding whether the Supreme
Court should be involved in reviewing the savings clause.240 Just one year
before the DOJ filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in Wheeler, it opposed
certiorari on a savings clause claim in McCarthan.241 In November 2017,
the DOJ resisted Supreme Court review and indicated that, instead, it was
developing a legislative solution to resolve the savings clause’s
ambiguities.242 An expert on collateral review, Professor Leah Litman of the
University of California Irvine School of Law, described the DOJ’s earlier
resistance to the Supreme Court’s involvement as “incredibly unseemly” and
“not a good look.”243 Now, however, the DOJ has changed its tune once
again—avowing that “[o]nly [the Supreme] Court’s intervention can provide
the necessary clarity” for the savings clause.244
Without a conclusive Supreme Court decision, the DOJ can continue
modifying its position irrespective of its impact on prisoners. For example,
the DOJ could easily modify its interpretation whenever it best supports a
different DOJ policy or a new political party is at the DOJ’s helm. Before its
most recent reconsideration, the DOJ invoked its 1998 interpretation in at
least eleven Supreme Court briefs.245 Furthermore, the DOJ implored the
Supreme Court to side with its positions on other issues by “leverag[ing] its
[prior] acceptance of the majority” savings clause standard.246 Thus, future
modifications to the DOJ’s interpretation of the savings clause would create
236. See Liptak, supra note 134.
237. See Leah Litman & Lark Turner, DOJ Goes Big So Prisoners Can’t Go Home, TAKE
CARE (Oct. 26, 2017), http://takecareblog.com/blog/doj-goes-big-so-prisoners-can-t-go-home
[https://perma.cc/8F5X-QGP8].
238. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 434 (4th Cir. 2018) (calling it “curious
then that the Government chose now—literally in the middle of Appellant’s case—to
completely change course”), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); see also
infra Part II.B.1.
239. Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 434 n.12.
240. Compare Liptak, supra note 134 (commenting that the DOJ was considering
legislative, rather than judicial, solutions), with Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note
40, at 13 (stating that “[o]nly this Court’s intervention can provide the necessary clarity”).
241. Liptak, supra note 134.
242. See id.
243. Id.; see also Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that “when the
government changes position on a concededly important question that has divided the circuits,
it should at least have the courage of its convictions and be willing to defend its new position
on the merits in this Court”).
244. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 13 (emphasis added).
245. See Reply Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 1, at 3.
246. Id. at 5.
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confusion and cast doubt on other areas of supposedly settled law.
Furthermore, the statute’s far-reaching and significant implications for
prisons make stability even more desirable.247
C. The Circuit Split Presents a Recurring and Fundamental Issue
to Prisoners’ Equitable Treatment
The savings clause’s effect is particularly pronounced because of the
provision’s relevance to weighty criminal cases.248 Typically, when the
Supreme Court rejects lower courts’ interpretations of a federal criminal
statute in favor of a more restrictive one, the Supreme Court’s interpretation
is retroactively applicable.249 The Supreme Court has issued many such
decisions over the last decade, but only inmates in certain circuits can
currently benefit from them.250 Prisoners located in the Tenth and Eleventh
Circuits are foreclosed from invoking such retroactive precedent on collateral
review.251 Consequently, inmates are either detained for activity that is no
longer criminal or for a term beyond what the law recommends.252 Despite
these concerns, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in McCarthan and
refused to take up the issue.253
The government filed a petition for a writ of certiorari in Wheeler only ten
months after the Supreme Court denied certiorari in McCarthan.254
However, recent criminal justice reform supports bolstering prisoners’ rights.
In December 2018, President Trump signed the First Step Act into law.255
Notably, the First Step Act makes the Fair Sentencing Act of 2010
retroactive.256 The Fair Sentencing Act lessened distinctions in sentencing
for those convicted of crimes involving crack versus powder cocaine.257
Prisoners convicted before 2010 may only take advantage of the Fair
Sentencing Act’s retroactivity by petitioning a court.258 Since Congress—
247. See infra Part III.C.
248. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 21.
249. See id. at 21–22 (citing Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 351–52 (2004)).
250. See id. at 21.
251. See id. at 22, 26.
252. Id. at 22.
253. Id. at 21 (recognizing the split as “recurring and fundamental to the fairness of the
criminal justice system”).
254. See generally McCarthan v. Collins, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); Petition for a Writ of
Certiorari, supra note 40.
255. Nicholas Fandos, Senate Passes Bipartisan Criminal Justice Bill, N.Y. TIMES (Dec.
18, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/18/us/politics/senate-criminal-justice-bill.html
[https://perma.cc/HZ6T-WPVZ]; Justin George, What’s Really in the First Step Act?,
MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 16, 2018, 12:45 PM), https://www.themarshallproject.org/
2018/11/16/what-s-really-in-the-first-step-act [https://perma.cc/9PBP-K28Z].
256. First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194, 5222; see also
George, supra note 255; Charlotte Resing, How the First Step Act Moves Criminal Justice
Reform Forward, ACLU (Dec. 3, 2018, 4:00 PM), https://www.aclu.org/blog/smartjustice/mass-incarceration/how-first-step-act-moves-criminal-justice-reform-forward
[https://perma.cc/2MRB-MPAA].
257. George, supra note 255; Resing, supra note 256.
258. See George, supra note 255. The First Step Act’s other reforms also expand prisoners’
rights, though they are not retroactive. See Resing, supra note 256.
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rather than a court—made the Fair Sentencing Act retroactive, inmates can
seek relief through a motion for imposition of a reduced sentence rather than
the savings clause.259 Nevertheless, the U.S. Sentencing Commission
estimates that this change will impact 2660 prisoners convicted of crack
offenses before 2010.260 Jared Kushner, the president’s advisor and son-inlaw, noted that “[f]or all those who are deserving of a second chance, this
legislation will make a meaningful and measurable difference in their
lives.”261 This emphasis on granting prisoners a second chance underscores
the importance of resolving the circuit split in their favor.
IV. A DEFINITIVE SAVINGS CLAUSE TEST: RESOLVING THE
CIRCUIT SPLIT ON § 2255(E)
The Supreme Court must permit habeas petitioners to challenge their
sentences or convictions through the savings clause. First, the Supreme
Court should explicitly define the savings clause to allow prisoners to bring
habeas petitions if they claim that intervening retroactive case law either
renders them actually innocent of their underlying convictions or creates a
fundamental defect in their sentences. Second, the Fourth Circuit’s
interpretation of the savings clause is consistent with that of the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits, contrary to the position taken by Judge Agee and the
DOJ.262 Third, this Note’s expansive approach to the savings clause is
consistent with the text, history, and purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 2255.
A. A Proposed Solution: Construing the Savings Clause Broadly
to Permit Challenges to Convictions and Sentences
This Note posits that the Supreme Court must construe the savings clause
to allow prisoners to test the legality of their convictions, as exemplified by
the Third and Fifth Circuits,263 and their sentences, as permitted in the
Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits.264 This Note’s test lessens the current
savings clause confusion by combining elements from different circuits’
259. Soon after President Trump signed the First Step Act, a prisoner named Matthew
Charles filed a motion for imposition of a reduced sentence. See generally Matthew Charles’s
Motion for Imposition of a Reduced Sentence Pursuant to Section 404 of the First Step Act,
United States v. Charles, No. 3:96-00051 (M.D. Tenn. Dec. 27, 2018), ECF No. 251. The
U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee granted the motion and released
Charles. Order, United States v. Charles, No. 3:96-00051 (M.D. Tenn. Jan. 3, 2019), ECF No.
253.
260. U.S. SENTENCING COMM’N, SENTENCING AND PRISON IMPACT ESTIMATE SUMMARY
S. 756, THE FIRST STEP ACT OF 2018 (AS PASSED BY THE SENATE ON DEC. 18, 2018) tbl.1 (2018),
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/prison-and-sentencingimpact-assessments/December_2018_Impact_Analysis.pdf [https://perma.cc/2R6Q-MGC9];
see also George, supra note 255; Resing, supra note 256.
261. Annie Karni, The Senate Passed the Criminal Justice Bill. For Jared Kushner, It’s a
Personal Issue and a Rare Victory., N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/12/14/us/politics/jared-kushner-criminal-justice-bill.html [http://perma.cc/5qmj-lug6].
262. See supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
263. As discussed earlier, the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits similarly allow actual
innocence challenges. See supra Part II.B.1.
264. See supra Part II.B.
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tests.265 Under the proposed standard, a motion under § 2255 is “inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of [a federal prisoner’s] detention”266 where
the prisoner, who has already exhausted his or her § 2255 remedies, claims
that a retroactive267 and binding intervening statutory interpretation
decision268 (1) renders the prisoner “actually innocent” of the underlying
criminal conviction, or (2) creates a “fundamental defect” in his or her
sentence. For purposes of this test, establishing “actual innocence” requires
petitioners to show that “it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror
would have convicted” them considering all available evidence.269 A
subsequent case creates a “fundamental defect” in sentencing if it changes
the applicable statutory sentencing framework such that a defendant was
sentenced under an improper sentencing range. Examples include, but are
not limited to, cases restricting the factors that a court may consider in
applying a mandatory sentencing enhancement.270
Importantly, a “fundamental defect” is not limited to sentences greater than
the statutory maximum.271 A prisoner may invoke the savings clause even if
his or her sentence is less than the appropriate statutory ceiling.272 For
purposes of this test, a “statutory maximum” is the maximum sentence that
the sentencing court could have imposed with the earlier precedent that is
now being disputed.273 Thus, this test permits savings clause relief even if a
sentencing court could have imposed the same sentence absent the
“fundamental defect.”
B. The Fourth Circuit Test Is Equivalent to the
Sixth and Seventh Circuit Test
The Wheeler dissent and the government’s conflict with the Wheeler
majority is grounded in each side’s distinct understandings of the relevant
statutory maximum.274 Judge Agee and the government contend that the
265. This Note’s test is most consistent with the Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits’ tests,
which allow challenges to convictions or sentences. Most cases, however, including the recent
Wheeler decision, only focus on one type of challenge. This Note argues that a comprehensive
standard is ideal to promote judicial efficiency. While the Supreme Court may decline to
discuss challenges to underlying convictions if it grants certiorari in Wheeler, this Note’s test
is intended to fully eliminate the savings clause circuit split.
266. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
267. See supra notes 150–53 and accompanying text.
268. See supra notes 154–56 and accompanying text.
269. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 623 (1998) (quoting Schlup v. Delo, 513 U.S.
298, 327 (1995)); see supra note 149 and accompanying text.
270. One example of such a decision is United States v. Simmons, 635 F.3d 140 (4th Cir.
2011), which was the basis of Wheeler’s claim. See supra notes 181–84 and accompanying
text. A second example is Chambers v. United States, 555 U.S. 122 (2009), the basis of
McCarthan’s claim. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 6–7. A third
example is Descamps v. United States, 576 U.S. 254 (2013), which Hill relied on. See supra
note 161.
271. See infra notes 281–95 and accompanying text.
272. See infra notes 281–95 and accompanying text.
273. See infra notes 281–95 and accompanying text for analysis of “statutory maximum”
and this definition.
274. See supra notes 192–96 and accompanying text.
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Fourth Circuit majority erroneously applied Hill and Brown.275 Accordingly,
they claim that the Sixth and Seventh Circuits only permit savings clause
challenges to sentences if they allege “the prisoner is being, or at some point
will be, detained by the warden beyond the time legally authorized by
Congress for his offense of conviction.”276 Conversely, the Wheeler
majority cited precedent from those circuits for the opposite premise.277
Wheeler identifies the same dispositive statutory maximum as the Sixth and
Seventh Circuits.278
The Fourth, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits agree that the pertinent statutory
maximum is the one that the original sentencing court should have applied
given the correction to the maximum established by a subsequent case.279
Judge Agee and the government instead focus on the maximum sentence the
original court could have imposed based on its interpretation at the time of
sentencing, notwithstanding the subsequent correction.280 As discussed
below, the prior Sixth and Seventh Circuit cases are consistent with the
Wheeler majority opinion.
The Seventh Circuit adopted its savings clause test and rationale in Brown
v. Caraway.281 The District of Delaware originally sentenced Brown to 360
months in prison.282 The district court erroneously designated Brown as a
career offender, which subjected him to a then-mandatory Guidelines range
of 360 months to life in prison rather than 262 to 327 months.283 Thus,
Brown’s sentence of 360 months was below the statutory maximum due to
his erroneous career offender label.284 On review, the Seventh Circuit
focused on the erroneous maximum, not the statutory maximum that should
have applied had Brown not been incorrectly designated a career offender.285
Further, Brown quoted Narvaez v. United States286 for the proposition that
“to ‘increase, dramatically, the point of departure of [the prisoner’s]
sentence’ . . . is ‘certainly as serious as the most grievous misinformation’”

275. United States v. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x 892, 893 (4th Cir. 2018) (mem.) (Agee, J.,
statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 40, at 24–25; see also supra notes 192–94 and accompanying text.
276. Wheeler, 734 F. App’x at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for
rehearing en banc) (emphasis added); see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40,
at 24–25.
277. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
278. See supra notes 188–89 and accompanying text.
279. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 432–33 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for cert.
filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); Brown v. Caraway, 719 F.3d 583, 587–88 (7th Cir.
2013); Narvaez v. United States, 674 F.3d 621, 629 (7th Cir. 2011).
280. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 24–25; see also Wheeler, 734
F. App’x at 893 (Agee, J., statement respecting denial of petition for rehearing en banc)
(distinguishing between the Fourth Circuit’s approach and that of the Sixth and Seventh
Circuits).
281. 719 F.3d at 587–88.
282. Id. at 585.
283. Id.
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. 674 F.3d 621 (7th Cir. 2011).
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that has led to habeas relief.287 This language signals that that the Seventh
Circuit intended to continue granting savings clause review to remedy
convictions, regardless of the statutory maximum.288 Moreover, the Narvaez
decision explicitly indicated that a petition could be successful even if a
sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum.289
The Sixth Circuit later adopted the Seventh Circuit’s interpretation in Hill
v. Masters.290 The Hill court stated that Brown’s sentence “did not exceed
the statutory maximum.”291 Again, this supports the Wheeler majority’s
emphasis on the erroneous statutory maximum.292 The District of South
Carolina originally sentenced Hill to 300 months in prison due to his
inaccurate designation as a career offender, which subjected Hill to a
Guidelines range of 292 to 365 months.293 Hill argued that absent his
mistaken label as a career offender, he would have been subject to a
Guidelines range of 235 to 293 months.294 Nevertheless, the court clarified
that Hill’s sentence fell below the statutory maximum life sentence.295 After
examining Sixth and Seventh Circuit precedent, the government’s contention
that these circuits’ decisions were limited to sentences beyond “the
applicable maximum under a statute or under a mandatory Sentencing
Guidelines regime”296 is inaccurate.
C. Evaluating a Broad Construction of the Savings Clause
Through Its Text, Purpose, and History
The text, purpose, and history of 28 U.S.C. § 2255 support this Note’s
proposed construction of the savings clause. Together, this compels savings
clause relief for challenges to convictions and sentences. As amicus curiae
in McCarthan, the Constitution Project framed the issue as a simple choice
between antithetical alternatives.297 In passing and later codifying the
savings clause, Congress either: (1) created a useless provision that would
not facilitate its goals, or (2) tried to safeguard prisoners by giving them “a
meaningful opportunity to raise challenges to the fundamental legality of
their convictions or sentences that cannot be raised under Section 2255.”298

287. 719 F.3d at 587–88 (emphasis added) (quoting Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 629).
288. See United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 432–33 (4th Cir. 2018) (discussing the
Seventh Circuit’s savings clause rationale), petition for cert. filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3,
2018).
289. Narvaez, 674 F.3d at 629 (“The fact that Mr. Narvaez’s sentence falls below the
applicable statutory-maximum sentence is not alone determinative of whether a miscarriage
of justice has occurred.” (emphasis added)).
290. 836 F.3d 591, 599 (6th Cir. 2016).
291. Id. at 597.
292. See Wheeler, 886 F.3d at 433; supra notes 189–91 and accompanying text.
293. Hill, 836 F.3d at 593.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 596.
296. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 24.
297. See Constitution Project Brief, supra note 75, at 20.
298. Id. Consistent with this Note’s proposal, the Constitution Project advocated for the
second option. Id.
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The phrasing of § 2255(e) neither defines “inadequate or ineffective” nor
indicates what may qualify as such.299 Thus, courts have largely inferred the
text’s meaning from other words in the clause.300 The savings clause allows
habeas petitions if “the court which sentenced [the prisoner] has denied him
relief” through a § 2255 motion and if the “remedy by motion is inadequate
or ineffective.”301 Accordingly, courts could refuse relief based on a claim’s
merits or procedural deficiencies, such as the limit on successive § 2255
motions.302 However, in Prost v. Anderson,303 Judge Gorsuch focused on
the distinction between the words “remedy” and “relief.”304
Judge Gorsuch’s contention that remedy and relief are dissimilar305 is
overstated. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “remedy” as “[t]he means of
enforcing a right or preventing or redressing a wrong; legal or equitable
relief.”306 Similarly, it defines “relief” as “[t]he redress or benefit . . . that a
party asks of a court,” which is “[a]lso termed remedy.”307 Professor Litman
has noted that federal statutes often use these words in conjunction with each
other, with a remedy causing relief as its outcome.308 Furthermore, the
Supreme Court itself has used these words interchangeably.309 Thus,
whether a prisoner obtained relief may be relevant to the question of
inadequacy or ineffectiveness, even if he or she had access to a § 2255 motion
as a remedy.310
The savings clause goes on to state that a prisoner can bring a habeas
petition if a § 2255 motion “is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of
his detention.”311 Both “test” and “legality” shed light on the meaning of
299. See 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
300. See, e.g., United States v. Wheeler, 886 F.3d 415, 428–29 (4th Cir. 2018), petition for
cert. filed, No. 18-420 (U.S. Oct. 3, 2018); McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast,
Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1085–95 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); Prost v.
Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584–85 (10th Cir. 2011).
301. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e).
302. Id.; see also Leah M. Litman, Legal Innocence and Federal Habeas, 104 VA. L. REV.
417, 488 (2018).
303. 636 F.3d 578 (10th Cir. 2011).
304. Id. at 584–85; supra notes 117–20 and accompanying text; see also Litman, supra
note 302, at 488.
305. See Prost, 836 F.3d at 584–85; supra notes 118–20 and accompanying text; see also
Litman, supra note 302, at 488.
306. Remedy, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Remedy, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/remedy [https://perma.cc/76MXRLPQ] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (defining “remedy” as “something that corrects or
counteracts” or “the legal means to recover a right or to prevent or obtain redress for a wrong”).
307. Relief, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014); see also Relief, MERRIAMWEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/relief [https://perma.cc/ZH8QEPPS] (last visited Feb. 12, 2019) (defining “relief” as “removal or lightening of something
oppressive, painful, or distressing” or “legal remedy or redress”).
308. Litman, supra note 302, at 488.
309. Litman, supra note 93, at 74 (“But the Court has used ‘remedy’ to refer to the result a
plaintiff obtained by filing suit, not just the process applicable to different kinds of lawsuits.”).
310. Cf. Litman, supra note 302, at 488 (arguing that “Section 2255(e)’s use of the word
‘remedy’ does not signify that it is irrelevant whether a prisoner is able to obtain relief under
Section 2255”). But see Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 584–85 (10th Cir. 2011).
311. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
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“inadequate or ineffective.” Yet, “to test” does not command courts to
disregard relief.312 For example, if a prisoner raises an argument in a § 2255
motion that prior precedent squarely opposes, that remedy (meaning the
§ 2255 motion) may not have been an adequate “test.”313
Moreover, the word “detention” should not be read to exclude challenges
to convictions or sentences.314 One scholar argues that Congress
intentionally chose the word “detention” in § 2255(e) as opposed to
“sentence,” which appears in § 2255(a).315 From this distinction, the author
posits that the savings clause only allows claims “related to the very act of
confinement itself.”316 However, prisoners can already challenge that subset
of claims in § 2241 petitions,317 which renders this reading of the savings
clause superfluous. Moreover, prisoners are detained pursuant to their
convictions and sentences. Thus, whenever an inmate’s conviction or
sentence is flawed, “the legality of his detention”318 is called into question.
Finally, in Prost, Judge Gorsuch relied on structuralism to elucidate the
savings clause’s text. Gorsuch argued that the savings clause must foreclose
relief so that § 2255(h)’s restrictions on multiple motions are not
undermined.319 He opined that Congress believed that finality should prevail
and prohibit prisoners from raising the same claims again.320 While this may
accurately describe Congress’s motive for passing § 2255(h), it does not
explain the safety net321 that § 2255(e) provides. Congress enacted § 2255(e)
nearly fifty years before § 2255(h).322 Construing § 2255(e) based on § 2255
as a whole “would ‘effectively nullify the gatekeeping provisions’ that
Congress carefully wrote into that statute.”323 Therefore, the expansive time
span between these provisions further weakens Gorsuch’s argument that
§ 2255(e) should be read to comply with § 2255(h).324
Since the savings clause does not explicitly define “inadequate or
ineffective,” the purpose and history behind this statute are particularly
compelling. Judge Gorsuch erroneously claims that § 2255(e)’s history
shows that Congress “surely” did not intend for it to allow prisoners to “win
relief on a meritorious successive motion, or receive multiple bites at the

312. See Litman, supra note 302, at 488 (arguing that “the word ‘test’” does not “imply a
limitation on the kinds of claims that can be brought under Section 2255”). But see Case,
supra note 105, at 192–93.
313. Contra Prost, 636 F.3d at 589.
314. But see Case, supra note 105, at 190–92.
315. Id.
316. Id. at 192.
317. See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
318. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012).
319. Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 585–86 (10th Cir. 2011); see also supra notes 121–
22 and accompanying text.
320. Prost, 636 F.3d at 588.
321. See supra note 103 and accompanying text.
322. See Litman, supra note 93, at 75.
323. Lester v. Flournoy, 909 F.3d 708, 716 (4th Cir. 2018) (quoting In re Jones, 226 F.3d
328, 333 (4th Cir. 2000)).
324. See Litman, supra note 93, at 75.
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apple.”325 On the contrary, both Congress and the courts have progressively
extended the scope and availability of collateral review.326
For § 2255 specifically, Congress’s “purpose and effect . . . was not to
restrict access to the writ but to make postconviction proceedings more
efficient.”327
Although the AEDPA somewhat constrained habeas
procedures, its restrictions largely codified long-standing common-law
principles.328 Judge Gorsuch relied on a 1952 Supreme Court decision,
United States v. Hayman,329 to support his claim that Congress did not enact
the savings clause “to expand or ‘impinge upon prisoners’ rights of collateral
attack.’”330 Notably, however, Prost largely neglects Boumediene v.
Bush,331 in which the Supreme Court clarified that § 2255 and its savings
clause were “designed to strengthen, rather than dilute, the writ’s
protections.”332 Strengthening a statute’s efficacy is not incompatible with
extending prisoners’ rights.
Furthermore, a broad reading of the savings clause will not compromise
Congress’s purpose.333 Congress wanted § 2255 to lessen the burden on
courts located in districts with federal prisons, which were inundated with
habeas petitions.334 This desire, however, does not mandate keeping
prisoners incarcerated against the law.335 Though prisoners file habeas
petitions through the savings clause in the district where they are
incarcerated, a broad reading of the provision is not a free-for-all. The
majority of circuits, and this Note’s proposed test, have restrictive conditions
that inmates must satisfy.336
Despite the dearth of legislative history discussing the savings clause’s
meaning, the historical context surrounding this statute supports this Note’s
suggested interpretation of the savings clause.337 Though various iterations

325. Prost, 636 F.3d at 588.
326. See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 773 (2008); see also Hill v. United States,
368 U.S. 424, 427–28 (1962).
327. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 774–75 (emphasis added); see also Hill, 368 U.S. at 427–
28.
328. See supra notes 90–91 and accompanying text; see also Constitution Project Brief,
supra note 75, at 3 (“[T]hose restrictions merely codified common law doctrines designed to
prevent the ‘abuse of the writ’ by sandbagging or repeated relitigation of the same claims.”).
329. 342 U.S. 205 (1952).
330. Prost, 636 F.3d at 588–89 (quoting Hayman, 342 U.S. at 219).
331. 553 U.S. 723 (2008).
332. Id. at 776.
333. Contra Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 40, at 21.
334. See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
335. Contra McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1076, 1092
(11th Cir.), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note
40, at 20–21.
336. See supra Parts II.B, IV.B.
337. See, e.g., Wofford v. Scott, 177 F.3d 1236, 1241 (11th Cir. 1999) (observing that there
is “nothing in the legislative history explaining” changes to the language in the savings clause
or what prompted the change); In re Davenport, 147 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 1998) (stating
that “legislative history is uninformative” regarding why Congress created the savings clause
and that “there is no helpful legislative history” indicating why Congress kept the savings
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of § 2255 used different language, the provision always provided federal
prisoners with some access to § 2241.338 In 1943, the first version of this
bill, entitled “A Bill to Regulate the Review of Judgments of Conviction in
Certain Criminal Cases,” appeared in the Report of the Judicial Conference
of Senior Circuit Judges.339 That version of the statute prohibited a prisoner
from filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus “unless it appears that it has
not been or will not be practicable to have his right to discharge from custody
determined on such motion because of the necessity of his presence at the
hearing, or for other reasons.”340 A Senate report in 1948, which considered
this bill with slightly different language, indicated that the “other reasons”
would be viewed with significant flexibility.341
While the Senate passed the aforementioned bill, the House of
Representatives failed to act.342 Nevertheless, Congress integrated that bill
into a later version that it approved, albeit with different wording.343 The
language that Congress first enacted is identical to the current formulation of
the savings clause.344 Thus, the operative savings clause has always hinged
on inadequacy or ineffectiveness, which is “broader language” than that of
earlier proposals.345 Though there is no legislative history conclusively
delineating the savings clause’s reach, this information signals that Congress
intended this clause to provide more extensive access to § 2241. Ultimately,
a broad construction of the savings clause best conforms to its text, purpose,
and history.
D. Comprehensive and Calculated: Applying the Savings Clause
Should the Supreme Court adopt this Note’s test, petitioners such as
Robert Bruce and Daniel McCarthan would have the opportunity to fully
dispute their imprisonments. The Eleventh Circuit, which takes the most
restrictive approach,346 previously denied both of these petitioners the chance
to bring habeas petitions through the savings clause.347 Robert Bruce sought

clause after the AEDPA); see also Litman, supra note 93, at 71 (stating that “there is no
legislative history to suggest” the meaning of “inadequate or ineffective”).
338. See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1239–41 (discussing various versions of § 2255(e), which
all reference situations in which a court could entertain a writ of habeas corpus).
339. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE, SEPTEMBER SESSION, 1943, at 23 (1943),
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/1943-09_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/9M4L-8JXW].
340. Id. at 24 (emphasis added); see also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
341. See S. REP. NO. 80-1526, at 2 (1948) (noting that there is “a wide discretion in the use
of habeas corpus where” a motion is unfeasible).
342. Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1241.
343. See id.
344. Compare id. at 1241 (quoting the “reworded” savings clause as prohibiting prisoners
from seeking relief under § 2241 “unless it also appears that the remedy by motion is
inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention”), with 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e) (2012)
(also prohibiting a prisoner from bringing a § 2241 petition “unless it also appears that the
remedy by motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention”).
345. See Wofford, 177 F.3d at 1241; see also supra note 105 and accompanying text.
346. See supra Part II.A.
347. See supra notes 28–30, 209 and accompanying text.
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to dispute his underlying conviction whereas Daniel McCarthan tried to
challenge his sentence.348
If Robert Bruce’s petition were to proceed, the outcome would likely
correspond with the Third Circuit’s decision for his brother, Gary Bruce.349
On the merits, Robert likely would not be able to show that he is actually
innocent of witness-tampering murder.350 Yet, the savings clause’s
significance lies in the opportunity it affords petitioners, irrespective of a
petition’s ultimate success or rejection.351
If the Eleventh Circuit were to review McCarthan’s petition, he likely
would obtain full habeas relief. In 2003, McCarthan pleaded guilty to being
a felon in possession of a weapon.352 The prosecution noted that
McCarthan’s three prior convictions were predicate offenses under the
Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA).353 Accordingly, the Middle District
of Florida sentenced McCarthan to 211 months in prison with five years of
supervised release.354 The court imposed this sentence based on the
enhanced mandatory minimum sentence of fifteen years in prison with five
years of supervised relief.355 Absent the enhancement, McCarthan’s
maximum sentence would have been ten years’ imprisonment with three
years of supervised release.356 After the district court sentenced McCarthan,
the Supreme Court decided Chambers v. United States,357 which led to the
Eleventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Lee.358 Under Lee,
McCarthan’s prior offense of walkaway escape is no longer a crime of
violence and thus not an ACCA predicate offense.359
McCarthan could not contest his erroneous sentence enhancement because
he had previously filed a § 2255 motion and the Eleventh Circuit foreclosed
savings clause relief.360 If, however, the Supreme Court adopted a broad
reading of the savings clause, McCarthan would have a viable savings clause
habeas petition. For example, McCarthan would argue that after he received
an enhanced ACCA sentence, Lee—which is a retroactive statutory
decision—disqualified his walkaway escape as a violent felony. Applying
Lee, McCarthan would allege the court erroneously enhanced his sentence.
348. McCarthan v. Dir. of Goodwill Indus.-Suncoast, Inc., 851 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir.), cert.
denied, 138 S. Ct. 502 (2017); Bruce v. Warden, 658 F. App’x 935, 937–38 (11th Cir. 2016)
(per curiam), cert. denied, 137 S. Ct. 683 (2017).
349. See Bruce v. Warden, 868 F.3d 170, 180–81 (3d Cir. 2017); supra notes 31–32, 34
and accompanying text.
350. See Bruce, 868 F.3d at 183, 188–89; supra note 34 and accompanying text.
351. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
352. McCarthan, 851 F.3d at 1080; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note
42, at 5.
353. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 5.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id.
357. 555 U.S. 122 (2009). In Chambers, the Supreme Court recognized that certain escapes
are not violent felonies under the ACCA. Id. at 123, 130.
358. 586 F.3d 859 (11th Cir. 2009).
359. Id. at 874; see also Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 6.
360. See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 42, at 8–9.
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Furthermore, McCarthan would note that this is a “fundamental defect” in
sentencing because his sentence exceeds the statutory maximum without the
enhancement of seven years’ imprisonment and two years of supervised
release. Though McCarthan’s erroneous sentence does exceed the correct
statutory maximum,361 this Note’s test is not limited to such circumstances.
As the Fourth Circuit explained, “incorrectly applied sentencing benchmarks
are fundamentally problematic because they wrongly cabin the district
court’s discretion to impose a lower sentence when the facts of the crime
warrant it.”362 In the end, a court would likely find McCarthan’s savings
clause claim to be meritorious and vacate and remand his case for
resentencing.
CONCLUSION
Ultimately, prohibiting prisoners from challenging their detentions when
a new decision directly invalidates their convictions or sentences contradicts
the savings clause. Contrary to Judge Gorsuch’s inapt analogy,363 unlawfully
incarcerating an individual is wholly different from the consequences that a
student may face for failing an exam. Congress enacted § 2255 and its
savings clause to foster efficiency in U.S. courts, not to curtail prisoners’
rights. Under the guise of judicial restraint, the Tenth and Eleventh Circuits
have transformed this provision into a hurdle for prisoners.364 Further, the
discord among the remaining circuits regarding the savings clause’s scope is
unnecessarily confusing. All sides to this debate agree that the Supreme
Court is tasked with interpreting and resolving conflicting interpretations of
the law. To be faithful to Congress’s goal in § 2255 of making habeas relief
more efficient, the Supreme Court must conclusively permit prisoners to
challenge their sentences or convictions under the savings clause.

361.
362.
363.
364.

See supra notes 354–56 and accompanying text.
Lester v. Flournoy, 909 F.3d 708, 714 (4th Cir. 2018).
See Prost v. Anderson, 636 F.3d 578, 589 (10th Cir. 2011).
See supra Part II.A.

